With the 2026 elections only days away, Uganda’s political landscape appears to be shifting in ways that may surprise many observers. Early indicators from opinion trends and ground-level sentiment suggest that President Yoweri Museveni could strengthen his performance in Buganda and Busoga, regions where he previously underperformed, while maintaining dominance in the West and North.
This projection may seem counterintuitive. Museveni is now over four decades into power, and public frustration with state performance is widespread. Basic services such as road maintenance, urban management, policing, and power reliability have deteriorated in many areas. His campaign messaging largely focuses on protecting past achievements rather than presenting a bold future vision, which has left some voters unconvinced.
Yet elections are not decided on dissatisfaction alone. They are won by organisation, messaging, and the ability to speak to people’s immediate economic realities. In this regard, the opposition, led by Robert Kyagulanyi, popularly known as Bobi Wine, appears to have stalled strategically.
Bobi Wine’s campaign has continued to centre on grievances, especially allegations of repression, arrests, and human rights violations. While these issues resonate with committed supporters, they do not directly address the daily economic pressures facing the majority of Ugandans, particularly job scarcity and income insecurity. As a result, his message has largely reinforced existing support rather than expanding it.
In Buganda and Busoga, where Bobi Wine performed strongly in the previous election, enthusiasm has noticeably cooled. The novelty of his candidacy has faded, and many voters now question whether his campaign offers a concrete path to employment and economic mobility. Running a near-identical strategy to the last election has reduced his appeal among undecided voters.
Meanwhile, Museveni and the National Resistance Movement have focused heavily on economic mobilisation at the grassroots. Programmes such as the Parish Development Model have injected funds directly into communities. While implementation has been uneven, the perception that government resources are reaching households has improved Museveni’s standing, especially in rural and peri-urban areas.
For many beneficiaries, these funds symbolise tangible concern for livelihoods. Even when used informally, the psychological effect has been powerful. In contrast, the opposition has struggled to offer an alternative economic framework that feels immediate and practical.
The opposition also faces a deeper strategic challenge. A long-held belief that electoral losses result solely from vote theft has limited innovation. While electoral conditions are clearly uneven and state power is frequently used to Museveni’s advantage, treating these obstacles as fixed without adapting tactics has weakened opposition momentum.
History shows these barriers are not absolute. Museveni once lost heavily in northern Uganda despite holding state power, yet now wins there comfortably. He previously dominated Buganda and Busoga, lost ground in 2021, and now appears positioned to regain it. These shifts point to strategy, not just structural advantage, as the deciding factor.
Ironically, it is Museveni, despite age and fatigue, who has adjusted tactics, while the younger opposition leadership has remained static. If Bobi Wine fails to expand his message beyond grievance politics in 2026, his position as the primary opposition figure may weaken, opening space for new leadership voices.
A strong opposition remains essential for Uganda’s democratic health. Without it, the ruling party faces little pressure to reform. The outcome of the 2026 elections may therefore mark not only another Museveni victory, but also a turning point for how opposition politics must evolve to remain relevant.
